Kapiolani
Community College Horizons 2003
Kapiolani
Community College
Horizons 2003
The world is coming out of a war between the United States and the regime of
Saddam Hussein, a war that was feared might end in nuclear fallout. The United
States foreign policy on Iraq shaped the events during the last twenty years.
It maneuvered the two countries from allies to enemies and, although it was key
in postponing the inevitable, eventually that policy would lead to a war that
would deal with Saddam Hussein once and for all. The conflict between Iraq and
the United States is the eventual consequence of that foreign policy.
Before delving into the United States foreign policy, it is important to understand
what foreign policy means in general. Foreign Policy as defined by Duncan,
Jancar-Webster, and Switky (2002) is “the policies pursued by government officials of a
state, designed to promote that country’s vital (core, national) interests
in the world” (p. 657). These interests of a state are its territorial
security, economic vitality, and sovereign political independence. There are
three general types of foreign policies: friendly, hostile, and neutral. When
the vital of a state are threatened, that state’s foreign policy often
becomes hostile towards the aggressor state. A foreign policy can likewise
become friendly when two states learn they can work together to achieve their
core or
national interests. Neutral policies exist when two nations have no interest
in each other, for example, Chile and Rwanda.
Originally, the United States had a neutral foreign policy toward Iraq, starting
when Iraq gained its independence in the 1930s. In the early 1980s the Reagan
Administration actively sought friendly relations with great success. In the
beginning of the 1990s, Washington was forced to change its foreign policy towards
Iraq to hostile and continued throughout the last decade to use different methods
to achieve the subsequent policy objectives.
The first major shift in United States/Iraq relations was in the 1980s, due
in large part to the Cold War. In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran with the
silent
backing of the U.S. government which was still angry at Iran for the hostage
taking at the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979. Officially, Washington
was neutral on the subject. By the beginning of 1982, Iraq and Iran were in
an all-out war and Moscow became allies with Iran. This forced the Reagan Administration
to ally itself with Iraq, under the assumption that “enemy of my enemy
is my friend” (Jentleson, 1994). The Administration felt that the USSR
and its communist ideals posed a greater threat to the U.S. than the small desert
country of Iraq. Although Washington was well aware of Saddam’s iron-fisted
dictatorship and usage of chemical weapons, it chose to turn a blind-eye towards
its ally because the national interests were being met fighting communism.
A large factor in the U.S. foreign policy towards Iraq is its complicated relationship
to the United Nations. The major purpose for the U.N. is to protect the sovereignty
of all nation-states. However, when Iraq invaded Iran, the U.N. remained neutral
because of the unanimous decision by the two superpowers of the time, the United
States, who encouraged the invasion, and the Soviet Union, who was an ally of
Iraq at the time of the invasion (Hiro, 2002).
President Bush, senior, continued the friendly foreign policy of the Reagan
Administration when he came into office in the later 1980s. He also continued
Reagan’s
blind-eye politics, which is evident throughout the first two years of his term.
For example, in August 1988 Saddam committed a horrible act of genocide with
chemical attacks on the Kurds in northern Iraq, and during the war with Iran
he unleashed 110,000 chemical munitions (Hiro, 2002). Even with full knowledge
of these chemical attacks, Bush signed National Security Directive 26 on October
2, 1989, stating the United States’ desire to achieve normal relations
with Iraq. This directive was meant to help U.S. long-term interests in the Middle
East through economic and political incentives for Iraq, regardless of Iraq’s
inhumane actions.
The United States continued to politically ignore the misdeeds of Iraq until
August 2, 1990, when Saddam invaded his neighbor to the south, Kuwait. After
the ten-year war with Iran, Iraq was in great debt. Saddam looked to his oil-rich
neighbors to cut production and raise the price of their oil, which would help
him raise the capital he needed. When they refused, Saddam thought there was
a conspiracy against him and used the episode as motivation to mobilize his troops
and invade Kuwait.
By gaining control of Kuwait, Saddam also wanted to gain access to the Kuwaiti
oil supply and the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab, the river by which Iraqi oil
is exported into the Persian Gulf. Upon taking over Kuwait, Saddam then planned
to march his troops into Saudi Arabia and eventually into the rest of the Middle
East. Saddam wanted to create a “Pan-Arab” (Hussein, 1979) nation
under the Ba’th government, his political party that has controlled Iraq
since the 1960s.
The invasion of Kuwait caused the United States foreign policy toward Iraq to
quickly change from friendly to hostile. American troops were sent to the Middle
East in what was termed Operation Desert Shield. Its main focus was to protect
Saudi Arabia, a strong ally in the region, from the impending invasion of Iraqi
troops. As a member of the United Nations Security Council, the U.S. has the
capability, as well as the responsibility, to influence world politics. In this
capacity, the U.S. not only wanted to protect the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia,
but also wanted to regain the independence of Kuwait.
The United Nations Security Council, with the endorsement of the United States,
passed Resolutions 660 and 661 in the beginning of August 1900. Resolution 660
was a condemnation of the Iraqi invasion; 661 was the imposition of economic
sanctions against Iraq until it removed itself from Kuwait. On November 29, 1990,
as Iraq still had not cooperated, the United Nations passed Resolution 678 authorizing
the use of force against Iraq.
Desert Shield turned into Desert Storm on January 17, 1991 when it became clear
that Saddam would not withdraw from Kuwait. After two and a half months of military
conflict, Saddam finally pulled his troops back, and the United Nations Security
Council declared a ceasefire resolution on March 2, 1991. On April 3, 1991, Resolution
687 was passed by the U.N. Security Council, which demanded that Iraq eliminate
all of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missile systems, and the infrastructure
in which such arsenals could be built. The resolution also required Iraq to recognize
Kuwait as an independent state, account for missing Kuwaitis, return Kuwaiti
properly, and end support for terrorism (Katzman, 2003). Once these rquirements
were met, the U.N. promised to lift the sanctions previously imposed on Iraq
in Resolution 661.
Since the end of Desert Storm, the United States foreign policy toward Iraq has
remained hostile. The objectives of the policy have been to contain Iraq by preventing
it from invasion of or aggression toward other nations, remove Saddam Hussein
and his regime from power and stop the Iraqi development of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Byman, 2000/2001). Economic sanctions, weapons inspections, regional military
presence, limited military strikes, and support for Iraqi opposition were the
main tools utilized by the United States to meet their policy objectives (Byman,
2000/2001), until early this year. These tools created success as well as failure.
As a whole, however, these instruments have worked together to successfully attain
U.S. policy objectives during the last decade.
The most highly criticized instruments that have been used by the American
government, through the United Nations, are the economic sanctions imposed
by Resolution
661 on August 6, 1990. The resolution forbade all member states of the United
Nations from importing any products from Iraq, promoting exports from the country,
and exporting any goods not for medicinal or food consumption purposes into
the country . It also stated that no member states could give money to the
Iraqi
government unless it was for humanitarian purposes (U.N. Security Council,
1990). Resolution 661 was originally designed as a way of forcing Saddam Hussein
to
comply with Resolution 660, which demanded that Iraq withdraw completely from
Kuwait. Once that happened, the sanctions were not removed from Iraq, but were
continued in Resolution 687. As stated earlier, the new goal of the sanctions
were to force Iraq to stop developing and start destroying weapons of mass
destruction. The United States has faced many tough critics, including its
allies, for backing
these economic sanctions. Although in some cases the sanctions have inadvertently
strengthened Saddam’s power, they have also helped fuel the U.S. containment
policy and have limited the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction cache.
The major humanitarian concern with the sanctions is that Saddam Hussein has
forced his people to carry the burden of these restrictions rather than let
them affect his own regime. Dennis Halliday, a UN official who started the
food-for-oil
program for Iraq, has alleviated this problem in some ways. The program, authorized
by Resolution 986 on April 14, 1995, was greatly disparaged by Saddam, although
it helped ease some of the suffering of his people. The Iraqi regime sold much
of the humanitarian goods provided for the citizenry of Iraq to neighboring
countries for black market profits, (Byman, 2000/2001). What little relief
the Iraqi people
did receive from the program, Saddam’s regime claimed to be the benefit
of their steadfast reserve against the United States and the United Nations
(Hiro, 2002).
After the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the objective of the sanctions was to
pressure Saddam to accept United Nations weapons inspections. It is likely that
without such pressure Saddam would never have allowed the U.N. weapon inspectors
into the country. In the last twelve years. The sanctions have also made it nearly
impossible for Saddam to acquire the weapons and technology needed to build his
WMD arsenal. The political damage to the United States has been great for supporting
the sanctions, at home as well as in the Middle East. Saddam has utilized false
propaganda to persuade much of the Arab and Muslim world to believe the economic
problems facing his country come from the sanctions and not from his own regime.
Even with the conflict between Iraq and the United States over, it seems it may
take a while for the sanctions to be lifted. The US is expected to seek several
Security Council resolutions to gradually lift the sanctions, allowing the Iraqi
economy to re-stabilize under the guidance of the U.N. and the U.S. This will
allow the implementation of the proper infrastructure to sustain the new economy
(Weisman, 2003).
The Arab nations within the Middle East greatly resent the sanctions. They
are also concerned with the seemingly unsympathetic position of the United
States
toward their Pan-Arab ideal, and they have become disgruntled with the U.S
containment endeavor. The Containment Policy the United States adopted towards
Iraq was meant
to keep Saddam from invading or showing aggression toward other countries,
especially within the Middle East region. Although Washington is sympathetic
to the region’s
desire to unite the Arab nations, the policy was meant to deter rulers such
as Saddam Hussein from destroying the sovereignty of other states in order
to attain
that goal.
Another tool that the United States used to keep Iraq contained was to assist
opposition to Saddam’s regime. In this endeavor, the United States was
shown no support (Abdel - Nabi, 2001). The policy’s goal was to indirectly
affect the power structure within the nation by giving support to the regime
opposition, which stemmed greatly from the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Shiites
in the south. However, in 1996 Saddam moved forcibly into the north, executing
and exiling many of the Kurdish opposition leaders.
The opposition parties that remained seem to be divided by religion, ethnicity,
and geography. The Arab and Sunni Muslim countries that oppose these factions
are worried that the replacement of Saddam’s regime will come in the
form of Kurds or the more conservative Shiite Muslims. Although most neighbors
of
Iraq do not support the regime, in the past they were inclined to allow Saddam
to remain in power if it meant keeping out these other influences. Saddam kept
these possibilities in the forefront of Arab and Sunni Muslim consciousness,
strengthening the hostility towards the United States.
Throughout the last decade, the support for the opposition has greatly influenced
Saddam to show reluctance in acting out aggressively. The instability also forces
him to focus more attention on his interior problems rather than contemplating
external aggressions. These positives recently prompted President George W. Bush
to authorize more covert attempts by the CIA and Special Forces to destabilize
the Iraqi government (Katzman, 2003). It was believed, however, by experts that
support for regime opposition needed to come from the countries sharing borders
with Iraq (Abdel-Nabi, 2001). At the time, the Bush Administration decided to
oppose the formation of any other form of leadership before Saddam could be taken
out of office. Now that Saddam and his regime have been defeated, there are many
opinions on how to form the new Iraqi government.
Other tools utilized in containing Iraq were to control the Iraqi oil revenue
and use military force as a deterrent. Since the end of the Gulf War, Iraq has
not shown any intentions on easing its aggression towards other nations, including
Kuwait. This has led the United States to continue a strong military presence
and, when necessary, limited military strikes within the region. The United States,
working with our allies and the United Nations, has also attempted to keep the
Iraqi military weak by setting limits on Iraqi oil sales and using the sanctions
imposed in Resolution 661 to control the spending of their oil profits.
All of these tools have helped the United States achieve its objectives, especially
the control of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In the aftermath of the Gulf
War, the United Nations formed a U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) to join the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the expressed purpose of verifying
the destruction of all banned WMD materials in Iraq and to establish a long-term
monitoring system within the nation. These objectives were spelled out in Resolution
715 on October 11, 1991 and were accepted by Iraq in November of 1993. Between
1991 and 1998, the inspectors were interrupted numerous times by the Iraqi
government, which prompted many new resolutions to be drafted by the United
Nations Security
Council. The largest blow to weapons inspections came on November 13, 1997
when Iraq expelled the American UNSCOM personnel. On the same day the American
inspectors
were banned, the United States House of Representatives passed House Resolution
322 backing U.S. military action as a last resort. According to Katzman (2003),
the Senate did not pass a similar resolution because “some Senators wanted
it to call for the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein.”
After many months of Iraqi dissention and United Nations resolutions, the situation
once again came to head on December 15, 1998. This time Iraq refused to hand
over documents known to hold key information regarding their WMD to UNSCOM. Operation
Desert Fox ensued lasting from December 16 to December 19. The operation was
a 70-hour bombing by American and British forces of known military targets and
WMD facilities. The allied forces refrained from targeting known chemical plants
to avoid unleashing poisons on Iraqi civilians and ceased before fulfilling its
mission due to expected adversity if the strikes continued into the Muslim holy
month of Ramadan. This breakdown between Iraq and the U.N. Security Council led
to a full year of no weapons inspections and many attempts at negotiations. Finally,
on December 17,1999, the Security Council agreed to lift most sanctions from
Iraq provided they cooperated fully with the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the new weapons inspection organization. Resolution
1284 was passed by a vote of 11-0. France, Russia, China, and Malaysia declined
to vote. Over the next four years, Iraq was uncooperative.
The effects of the sanctions, weapons inspections, military presence, and military
strikes within Iraq may not have stopped Saddam from possessing a WMD cache,
but they collectively helped to slow him down. That alone was a great success
of United States foreign policy throughout the 1990s. These methods also had
success in keeping Saddam militarily weak and from invading his neighbors.
Even if the United States’ policies have been less than perfect, they
have achieved many of their objectives.
At the beginning of last year the United States declared war against Saddam
Hussein without the approval of the United Nations. President Bush in a speech
delivered
on March 17, 2003, outlined the reasons his administration felt compelled to
advance on Saddam Hussein’s regime. His main focus was the breakdown of
diplomacy over the last twelve years and the defiance of the regime toward the
U.N. Security Council’s resolutions on disarmament. U.S. foreign policy
objectives of containment and disarmament were no longer working, even with
the help of the U.N. The U.S. could no longer afford the massive threat of
nuclear
or biological terror, nor could they allow the terrorist regime to remain in
power (Bush, 2003).
The policies the U.S. has incorporated for the last twenty years have been
filled with flaws, especially with the blind-eye policy of the 1980s, but they
have
also had their accomplishments. In the last decade Iraq was contained, Saddam
Hussein and his regime were taken out of power, and the U.S. is seeking out
and destroying Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The U.S. foreign policies
held Iraq at bay for over twelve years, but unfortunately they ultimately failed
to keep these two nations from war.
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